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Futures M arket Contracting  
W hen You D on ’t  Know W ho the Optim ists A re1
Ronald M. Harstad





If traders on futures markets for exhaustible resources rationally update from 
consistent priors, a prediction of a zero aggregate volume of speculative activity is both 
inescapable and readily invalidated. We have built models of speculative futures 
trading based upon inconsistent priors, analyzing games of inconsistent incomplete 
information. These models have assumed that the inconsistent priors are themselves 
common knowledge. In this paper, we explore the game-theoretic implications of 
treating doubly inconsistent incomplete information, in that inconsistent priors are 
private information, and traders attach inconsistent assessments to the probability that 
a trader will be an optimist.
The result is not arbitrary: the logic of a separating equilibrium can be specified 
via backwards induction. It is unlikely that subgame-perfect equilibria will exhibit 
pooling. The volume of speculative trading is reduced by informational constraints, but 
a sense is specified in which no ex ante agreed-upon Pareto improvements over 
separating equilibrium behavior can satisfy the information constraints for take-it-or- 
leave-it contracts.
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The standard literature on futures markets uses the assumption that all agents 
active in these markets have common priors. This assumption is a prerequisite for the 
construction of rational expectations models implying that the futures price is an 
unbiased predictor of the spot price at maturity. The present paper instead uses the 
more realistic assumption that agents have different priors: their beliefs are
“inconsistent” in this sense and reflect differences in opinion, not in information. For 
concreteness, each agent is one of two types: either an “optimist” or a “pessimist.” The 
optimist expects the spot price at maturity to be high; the pessimist expects it to be 
low. As these expectations are due to differences in opinion, in our model, an optimist 
would not adjust his estimate of the spot price upon learning that another agent is a 
pessimist; his estimate has already taken into account the possibility that other agents 
might have expectations he views as incorrect.
In addition, we suppose that agents know only their own type and “don’t know 
who the optimists are.” They assign subjective probabilities to other agents’ types, and 
these probabilities are also inconsistent. There is thus a double inconsistency, in that 
agents have inconsistent beliefs about inconsistent beliefs of their trading partners. Our 
purpose is to show that a game-theoretic treatment of such a situation, which is 
described by Selten [1982] as one of inconsistent incomplete information, is possible and 
provides interesting insights into the working of futures markets.
We have studied futures markets for natural resources in circumstances featuring 
extractors with market power in the cash market (Phlips and Harstad [1991], Harstad 
and Phlips [1990], Phlips and Harstad [1992], listed in the order they were written). 
Those papers have assumed inconsistent priors, as set out in the first paragraph above; 
this has allowed us to provide explanations of some stylized facts about futures markets 




























































































rational trade. A key limitation of the analysis in those papers is the assumption that, 
while priors are inconsistent, they are common knowledge. Here we explore the 
complications that arise under the more reasonable assumption that the fact of 
inconsistent priors is common knowledge, but the priors themselves are private 
information. The complications are considerable, and to focus on this issue, we have 
sharply curtailed unrelated complications. When simplifying assumptions allowing us to 
sidestep other issues are introduced, we will refer the reader to one of the other papers 
in which the issue sidestepped here is addressed.
The model in this paper is basically the two-stage noncooperative game studied 
in Phlips and Harstad [1991], but of course without the assumption that the players’ 
(inconsistent) beliefs about the spot price at maturity are common knowledge. The 
final stage of the game is an extraction subgame played by two risk-averse extractors, 
producers J. and fB, who use Cournot strategies. This subgame is defined over two 
periods (the second period being the maturity date). The first stage is a futures market 
in which the two producers trade (in period 1) with a representative risk-neutral 
speculator (player 1) in an “open cry” auction. The overall game is modeled in such a 
way that futures behavior can be separated from extraction subgame behavior. On the 
one hand, the double inconsistency of beliefs has no impact on the extraction subgame, 
so that the trading partner of a producer need not know this producer’s beliefs in order 
to predict what the impact of a futures contract on the extraction game will be. On the 
other hand, the speculator can (and must) evaluate the impact of the extraction game 
on the expected profitability of his own futures position.
A first insight is that inconsistent incomplete information may cause players to 
miss opportunities for futures contracting. Subgame-perfect equilibria create 




























































































(see Phlips and Harstad [1991]). It is intuitively clear that, when players are uncertain 
about the other players’ beliefs, some of these contracts may fail to materialize because 
a player incorrectly evaluates his trading partner’s type. This is generally true when 
two trading partners are of the opposite types. It is also true when they are of the same 
type. Indeed, trade is possible among them under complete as well as incomplete 
information about the partner’s type. Under incomplete information, however, the 
potential buyer may announce a futures price that is not acceptable to the potential 
seller when both are optimists, and the potential seller may announce an unacceptable 
price when both are pessimists, in situations where complete information would have led 
to profitable trade.
Second, subgame-perfect equilibria were found to reach Pareto-efficient outcomes 
when the players’ types are common knowledge. Under the assumptions made here, the 
desired equilibrium outcomes are also located on contract curves. However, these 
curves are based on subjective probabilities. Consequently, the announced (and 
accepted) futures positions may be larger or smaller than the “objectively” efficient 
ones. In a world characterized by uncertainty, however, an allocation mechanism is 
appropriately judged by its efficiency relative to the information available at the time 
the mechanism is put in place. In that sense, the game analyzed here reaches an ex 
ante efficient outcome in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Nonetheless, ex post, objective 
inefficiencies occur.
We emphasize that the behavior we analyze below is fully rational, and indeed, 
assumes players correctly handle extremely complex calculations. It is simply behavior 




























































































2. Rules of the Game
A futures market for the natural resource is opened at the beginning of period 1. 
The game unfolds as follows:
Step i :  Nature determines whether a player is optimistic or pessimistic, and privately 
informs each player of his type. Nature also determines a “commitment order,” that is, 
a permutation of the order ( A, IB, f ), which is common knowledge.
Step 2: Each player simultaneously announces one contract offer, either a sale or a
purchase offer. Each offer consists of a (price, quantity) pair, and is an all-or-nothing 
offer (neither price or quantity can be discussed). Once announced, the offers are 
irrevocable.
Step 2: The player designated first in the commitment order irrevocably accepts or
rejects each contract offered by another player.
Step 4: The player designated second in the commitment order irrevocably accepts or 
rejects each contract offered by another player and not yet accepted.
Step 5: The player designated third in the commitment order irrevocably accepts or 
rejects each contract offered by another player and not yet accepted. The futures 
market then closes.
Step 6: The extraction subgame occurs, that is, producers A  and IB simultaneously
determine what fraction of their stock of the resource to supply before the maturity 
date of the futures contracts. Technically, this ends the game.
Step 7: The market demand level is revealed and determines the spot price at




























































































Several aspects of this extensive form are highly simplified. Contracts are take- 
it-or-leave-it offers; Harstad and Phlips [1990] explore the changes in results if an agent 
can partially accept terms offered, by accepting a smaller quantity at the offered price. 
A player is limited to announcing a sale or a purchase contract offer, but not both; on 
this issue, see Phlips and Harstad [1991]. There are only two periods, so a trader does 
not have the opportunity to close out futures positions prior to maturity; Phlips and 
Harstad [1992] focuses on this issue. For our purposes here, we regard realism of the 
model as comparatively inconsequential.2
3. Inconsistent Incomplete Information
There are two sources of uncertainty. The first is about the level of aggregate 
demand: each player has an expectation pi (* =  B̂, if). These expectations are
2It is worth commenting on a specified order in which players commit themselves to contracts. 
This may not be too unrealistic a stylization if one envisions a futures market in which, initially, 
potential buyers indicate that they may buy, but desire a low price, while potential sellers do the 
reverse. For some period o f time, each side would maintain that the terms he announced are those 
which should be consummated, presumably by claiming that foregoing trade would be preferable to 
accepting his potential trading partner’s terms. Such claims would be made whether true or not, and 
are calculably unlikely to be true, so one envisions these claims as not being credible. In the final few 
moments before the closing bell, the chance that one may not be heard accepting a contract if  it is 
rejected now may suddenly lend credibility to whomever happens to have his mouth open and his 
potential trading partner’s attention at that moment. We model this commitment as random. True, 
the current paper takes the unrealistic tack of assuming that traders know from the beginning who will 
randomly be put in this position; this is simply to set aside a significant complication in order to deal 
with the issue of private information on prior beliefs. We have explored the nature o f the changes 
created when the commitment order does not become known until the moment of commitment, by 
invoking this difference when moving from our [1991] paper to our [1990] paper, which may be 





























































































inconsistent, since drawn from different distributions. For simplicity, these 
expectations are of two types: either pi =  pH or pf- = pL <  p . In words, a player is 
either an optimist or a pessimist. All optimists have the same mean expectation p^. 
All pessimists have the same mean expectation p^. The values pH and p^ are common 
knowledge.3 An economic interpretation of p is delayed until analysis of the extraction 
subgame in Section 4.
Second, each player knows his own type but does not know the types of the other 
players. They know that Nature determines whether a player is an optimist or a 
pessimist with probabilities4 A and (1 — A). However, each player has his own personal 
evaluation of A, A,-, f =  -X, “3B,
If the players knew the true A, their conditional subjective probabilities that any 
other player is an optimist or a pessimist would be equal to A or 1 — A, respectively. To 
illustrate, consider the probability matrix of type combinations given in Table 1. An 
optimistic i  is represented as and a pessimistic 1 as 1^, with types of J. and S  
analogously represented. The sum of its 8 elements is 1. This matrix is not correlated 
if A =  0.5. Otherwise, it is correlated. For example, with A =  0.6, the values in Table 2 
result.
3The model must continue to draw back until some aspects o f  the rules are common 
knowledge; Harsanyi [1968] defends the practice used here. O f course, a player’s beliefs could be viewed 
as still unknown in the presence o f information about whether or not he was an optimist: there could 
be two distinct, nondegenerate distributions o f p,, one for optimists and one for pessimists. 
Presumably the added complexity would still exhibit many o f the qualitative features o f the model 
presented here.
4The alternative assumption that Nature selects types out o f  a 3 X 2 probability matrix, as in 




























































































Table 1. Probability Matrix of Type Combinations
a h  jll a l
L •B*
yH A3 A2( l -A ) A2( l -A ) A (l-A )2
■iL A2( l - A ) A( 1—A )2 A (l-A )2 ( 1—A )3
Table 2. Probability Matrix of Type Combinations with A =  0.6,
1H
«jL
However, the subjective probability, for if with A = As =  0.6, that*a producer (say .A) is 
an optimist is 0.6, whether if is an optimist (0.36 -j- 0.6=0.6) or ta pessimist 
(0.24 -j- 0.4=0.6).
Consistent incomplete information is defined by the condition that all players 
know the true A and therefore have the same subjective probabilities. Inconsistent 
incomplete information allows for the fact that each player may have a different theory 
about how Nature selects types and may, therefore, evaluate A differently. Then we 
may have As ^  An ^  Aj. It seems plausible that a speculator may have a different view 
about how Nature selects types than a producer and that symmetric duopolists have 
similar views. Notice, however, that the values As,Aa,Aj and the corresponding
A h J." A 1
cgi
0.216 0.144 0.144 0.096




























































































probability matrices are common knowledge in the inconsistent as well as in the 
consistent case.
4. The Extraction Subgame
We start by modeling the last step of the game, namely step 6. The two 
producers have exogenous initial stocks sag and Sjq, which are common knowledge. In 
period 1, each extracts and sells 4(1 units (i =  -A,TB). In period 2, that is, at maturity, 
they extract and sell the remainder
The intercept a >  0 is unknown. The slope coefficient /3 > 0 is common knowledge; to 
simplify notation, we assume that physical units of the resource can be normalized so 
that 0 =  1.
Since we are interested in the futures market’s impact on the extraction policy, 
we set both the cost of extraction and the interest rate to zero. Risk aversion implies 
the certainty equivalent payoffs
1i2 ~  si0 ~  «il- (1)
In both periods, the instantaneous inverse demand function is
Pt(lat +  9bt) t — 1,2. ( 2)
=  EaK ] - % s a0- / a6- / as)2, (3.1)





























































































’’ a — ?2( «a2 +  «62 ) ( «a2 -  f ab ~ fa s ) +  P l(?al +  9fcl)9al +  Pabf ab +  Pas/as. (4-l)
*b =  ?2( «a2 +  «62) («62 +  fab “ /»* ) + Pl(«al +  «61 )?61 ~  Pa6-/a6 +  PtsAs’ (4-2)
/ aj > 0 is a futures position such that .X sells to jB (X  “goes short” and fB “goes long” ) 
at the futures price pab agreed between them, and similarly for f as and f b . Of course, 
f ba =  —/ aj in this notation. The spot price, pt, is equal, at maturity (period 2), to the 
futures price due to materialize: at maturity, all players will buy and sell futures only 
at the then valid spot price, so all futures positions are closed out at price p  ̂ in period 
2. This explains equations (4.1) and (4.2). Equations (3.1) and (3.2) use the mean- 
variance model (with constant absolute risk aversion parameters M a, M l) and the fact 
that P2(?a2 +  9i2) Pl(«al +  «6l) ^ave a common uncertain parameter a. The 
variance of each producer’s belief about a is normalized to 1, to simplify notation. 
There is no covariance term.
With given futures positions, simultaneous maximization of W a in gal and W b in 
9j l—with qb2 eliminated by (1)—gives the unique Cournot equilibrium strategies
_  'XO _  f  ab~̂  f  as , f  bs f  ab.
« a l 2 9 a 2 --2 “  +
âO , f  ab ^  f  as _  f  bs f  ab. (5.1)
«61 - - 2
^60 f  bs f ab , f ab fas.
3 + 6
_  360 fbs~  fab : fab + fa
«62 -  "2---------- 3 (5.2)
Producer X ’s net short futures position is f ab +  f as. Producer IB’s net short position is 




























































































maturity (g-j) for the net futures position he has taken and to partially counteract the 
adjustment his rival makes. If f ab +  f as > 0 and f bs- f ab< 2 ( f ab +  f as), then A  
makes his net short position more profitable by shifting extraction to at-maturity 
supply, driving down the spot price at maturity, and with it the value of the futures 
contracts he has (net) sold.
The equilibrium spot prices are
Pi =  P +  g ( / o s +  /(,,)'. Pi =  P ~ l ( f a s  +  f b s )> ( 6>
where ( / as + /j,s ) is the producers’ combined net short position (or the speculator’s net 
long position.) and
P 5a0 +  s602
This parameter can now be given a straightforward economic interpretation: p is the 
spot price that would prevail in both periods in Cournot equilibrium, if the producers 
were both inactive in the futures market. It is a natural benchmark. Since it is also a 
linear function of a, it is convenient to express beliefs in terms of p rather than a. The 
players’ beliefs are thus expressed as the mean expectations pa, pb and ps.
It should be noted that the equilibrium extraction rates do not depend upon the 
producers’ beliefs about a. A trading partner of a producer on the futures market can 
therefore predict how the producer will shift extraction in reaction to contracts accepted 
without knowing the producer’s expectations. It remains to be seen whether he can 




























































































5. Subgame-Perfect Acceptable Contracts
In order to study the subgame-perfect actions taken in steps 5 to 2, we first 
incorporate the extraction subgame’s equilibrium strategies (5.1)-(5.2) and the 
equilibrium prices (6) in the payoff functions W & and W^ of the producers and in the
risk-neutral speculator’s payoff
f>s =  ( P2 “  Pas) f  as +  (P2 “  Pbs) fbs' (7)
The result is
w a =  saQPa + V„, (8.1)
W b =  sbO?b +  V b' (8-2)
=  ( P s ~ P a s ) f a s  +  ( Ps — Pis ) //i i  -  g ( /a s  + ( 8 . 3 )
where
V a =  ( Pa6 Pa)fab +  ^Pas ~  Pa) f  as +  J g i f  as + f  bs)2 ~  ~ T ^ saO ~  f  a b~  f  as)2 ’ (9-1)
V b =  ( P z ~  Pab) fab +  ( ?6s _  P t )/is  +  l l ( / a «  +  /fcs)2 _  “T ( sb0 +  fab ~  fb s )2' (9-2)
We focus on V , V  ̂ and V , because the expected value of the stock, ^gPi’ is unaffected 
by futures trading or by extraction rates.
What contract terms will the players aim at in the futures market? When 
announcing a particular offer (a price and a quantity), a player aims at obtaining 




























































































whom the announced contract is intended. Each player therefore has to determine 
which terms are just acceptable to the other side of the market, namely, the highest 
price acceptable to the other party if an offer to sell is being announced, and the lowest 
price acceptable to the other party if an offer to purchase is being announced. Player 
IB, say, can do this by solving
Va-Va\ > 0 .5
fab ~  0
If IB wants to purchase from A [ f  ab > 0), any price equal to or higher than the price 
that satisfies the equality is acceptable to A, since
v a - v a l
fab =  0
is the contribution of the futures position f ab to .A’s expected profit and any 
nonnegative contribution will be preferable to not trading with S. The solution is
Pab ^  [ Po ~ Sa0 ~  fa s )] + fab as f ab £  0. (10.1)
5This equation assumes that A  accepts a contract which he is indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting. The reasons why subgame-perfect equilibrium requires this “accept when indifferent” 
principle in'bargaining games with infinite strategy spaces are elaborated in Binmore [1992], §5.8. This 
equation also assumes that A  and S  would otherwise not trade in the futures market. In other words, 
it assumes that has not accepted and will not accept any contract offered by A. For the situations 
below in which the equation is being relied on to characterize subgame-perfect equilibrium, this 
assumption fails only in pathological cases. Such pathologies can still be analyzed by the techniques 
used here; the only simplification lost is the linearity o f what would otherwise be parallel quadratic 




























































































The boldfaced italic subscript indicates the player for whom the price is acceptable. By 
the same reasoning,
pa.b "5" 1 pf> “  M b( 460 -  fbs ) ] - TT fab as f ab £  0, (10.2)
Pas \ Pa~ M a(sa0 -  f ab) - \ f bs] +  ( - ja - '^ ) /a s  
Pas ”>* [ Ps ~  J fbs 1 — $ fas
pbs [ Pb -  M b( sb0 +  fab) -  5 fas) +  ( - jr  ~ Tg) fbs 
pbs [ps _  % fas] ~ l  fbs
as /as | 0, (10.3)
as / 04 ̂  0, (10.4)
as / j ,  £  0, (10.5)
as f bs £  0. (10.6)
The difficulty for IB, in evaluating p ^ ,  for example, is that does not know 
whether J. is an optimist (pa =  p^) or a pessimist (pa =  p^). <3B must consider both 
possibilities and therefore define two boundary lines for the price-quantity combinations 
just acceptable to A. The same is true when A  evaluates the terms acceptable to 
according to (10.2): A  has to replace pb by pH and pL. For each of the possible
contracts, a figure similar to Figure 1 can be drawn.
Figure 1 illustrates the case of a sale by A  to If (f as > 0). The two upward- 
sloping lines represent the lowest selling prices .A can accept for pa =  p^ and (lower) for 
pa =  p^. The two downward-sloping lines represent the highest prices at which f  is 
willing to buy for ps — p^  and for ps =  jfi. The vertical distances between pairs of 
parallel lines is pH -  pL (so necessarily the same for both pairs). The relative 























































































































































































importantly, positions on contracts with the third player (*31, in the case shown where a 
contract between A  and If is being analyzed), as indicated in equations (10). When a 
sufficiently large share of the potential gains to trading futures between A  and If have 
been usurped by contracts one or the other player reaches with <3S, this positioning may 
become tight enough to switch from Figure 1 to Figure 2. (We return to this issue in 
section 7.1 below.) If information limitations can be surmounted, trading is possible 
whenever an upward-sloping and a downward-sloping line cross, and for price-quantity 
combinations inside the triangle formed by these lines and the vertical axis.
6. Contract Acceptances in the Order
Our analysis throughout will be limited to consideration of pure strategies, 
presumably not a serious restriction when a continuum of actions is available at step 2. 
Description of subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the associated inferences about types, 
quickly gets complex. As the qualitative properties do not depend upon the 
commitment order, we will present the analysis only for the order .ASlf. This 
substantially reduces repetition and adds some useful concreteness; the cost is a 
suggestion of higher payoff for A  and lower payoff for If, in general, than occurs across 
commitment orders. Where it aids concreteness, we will assume parameter 
configurations with the property that, were it common knowledge that all three players 
were of the same type (all optimists or all pessimists), then A  would take a net short 
position, If a net long position, and fB an intermediate position. This would be 
accomplished by giving A  a larger stock than fB, and setting their risk postures close 
approximations to each other, relative to stocks. While these parameter configurations 
are not essential to the analysis, they simplify presentation, and fit with the intuitive 
























































































































































































The analysis of subgame-perfect equilibrium proceeds, as is usual, backwards 
from Step 5. Before beginning, however, it is useful to note distinctions resulting from 
Step 2 behavior. It is common in games of incomplete information to distinguish 
between “pooling” and “separating” equilibria: in a pooling equilibrium, a player’s type 
is not revealed by his behavior, as both types choose the same strategy in equilibrium, 
typically because one type gains from hiding his identity. In a separating equilibrium, 
each type selects a different strategy, and no uncertainty about a player’s type remains 
after his action is observed.
Intermediate cases can arise here, which we have not seen considered before. 
Specifically, one or two players could choose announcements which reveal their type, 
with the rest of the players choosing pooling announcements in Step 2. During Steps 3, 
4 and 5, all players will face no uncertainty in predicting the behavior of a player who 
made a separating announcement, but may be unsure of which contracts, if any, will be 
acceptable to a player who chose a pooling announcement. To handle all possibilities, 
the following notation will be employed. Player i's announcement made in step 2 will 
be denoted ĉ  =  (p;, / ;), i =  f ,  where is a short position: / ;  >  0 implies i is
offering to sell futures at price p,-, while i is indicating a desire to go long (buy futures) 
at price pi if f i <  0. The information available in step 3 about players’ types as 
revealed in equilibrium announcements c =  (c0, Cj, cs) is summarized by 
I  =  (IaT,I*>T,I ST), where I 'T takes the value 1'^ if i made a separating announcement 
which revealed him to be an optimist, if i made a separating announcement which 
revealed him to be a pessimist, and if i made a pooling announcement which would 
be made in the equilibrium under analysis by both types of player i.
The next three subsections provide the detailed logic of backwards induction in 




























































































4 and then 3. These subsections may not yield facile reading, but they are the heart of 
the analysis, in that step 2 decisions as to which contracts to announce at the beginning 
of the futures market are indecipherable without a clear understanding of how 
alternative announcements would affect which trades actually occur. Readers skeptical 
about slogging through the detail may wish to skip, at least initially, to the summary in 
subsection 6.4, page 21.
6.1. f s  Contract Acceptances in Step 5
Any type of any player, whether a producer or not, has no reason to engage in 
pooling behavior once step 5 is reached: behavior in the extraction subgame is
independent of all aspects of beliefs, given contracts accepted. At this point in the 
game, J faces no uncertainty about which other contracts will be accepted, or what his 
net short position would be if he were to refuse to accept any contracts in step 5. Thus, 
his step 5 decisions are governed strictly by substituting the correct value of ps into 
equations (10.4) and (10.6).
It will generally be the case (verified below) that S will find at most one 
outstanding contract which is acceptable to him.6 * If the outstanding contract is like c2 
or c4 in Figure 1, it will be accepted by either type 5s  or i L, because being on the 
indifference line for places the contract in the interior of the acceptance region for 
i 11. Similarly, a contract like c2 in Figure 2 will be accepted by either type of f. 
Contracts like Cj and c2 in either figure will be accepted by type who is just 
indifferent, but type is strictly better off rejecting such contracts. Conversely, a 
contract like c4 in Figure 2, which shows a negative position because A  has offered to
6If both contracts are acceptable, an optimal decision to accept both will not depend upon
which is accepted first. If either is acceptable in the event the other is rejected, but unacceptable in the
event the other is accepted, a straightforward comparison o f which contract places If on the higher




























































































buy futures from f , is just acceptable to type 3^, but will be rejected by type 3^ as 
implying selling at too low a price.
Given information I s^  or I s  ̂ revealed by If’s announcement, the information of 
the previous paragraph becomes common knowledge at the beginning of step 3, and 
commitments in steps 3 and 4 can be made knowing what will happen in step 5. Given 
information / s®, however, the same announcement is made in equilibrium by both types 
of If, and player A  commits in step 3 on the basis of a probabilistic assessment, as 
follows: contracts like c4 or Cj are expected to be accepted by 5  with probability Aa, 
and a contract like c4 in Figure 2 is expected to be accepted by S with probability 
1 — Aa. In step 4, IB commits on the basis of similar expectations, only using Aj for the 
probability that Cj or Cg get accepted, and 1 — Aj for the probability that c4 in Figure 2 
gets accepted. The essence of inconsistent incomplete information is that '$ continues 
to use the same Aj to evaluate 3’s type after learning what A  is doing. That types iH 
and use the same A,- is simply the result of a parsimonious modeling assumption.
6.2. fB’s Contract Acceptances in Step 4
Assuming subgame-perfect play of the extraction subgame, each player’s payoffs, 
as perceived by him at any time during the game, are a function of contracts accepted, 
and of his beliefs, but not of rivals’ types. Since, as mentioned, the extraction 
subgame’s play is independent of beliefs, no type of 5  has any incentive to pool so as to 
hide his identity during step 4. Moreover, IB’s behavior in step 4 is unaffected by 
whether he has learned .A’s type.
Given information I sH or / s i , fB can anticipate, for any pattern of open 
contracts that he might accept, what remaining open contracts 3 will accept in step 5. 
Accordingly, S  can insert the proper values of the f ’s into (10.2) and (10.5) to 




























































































(10) could indicate that an open contract ci is acceptable to SB if and only if an open 
contract c;- will [alternatively, will not] be accepted by 3, IB /  i ^  j  (but possibly 
j  =  SB), yet SB knows that 3 will not [will] accept contract Cj if IB accepts ('■■ This is a 
finite-strategy version of a familiar Stackelberg leader problem, solved by a straight­
forward comparison of SB’s payoff when c- but not Cj is [ĉ  and Cj are] accepted with SB’s 
payoff when Cj but not ci is [neither c,- or Cj are] accepted. Such a complication shows 
up as a distance-maintaining parallel shift in the two lines in a diagram such as Figure 1 
or 2 that relate to minimally acceptable contracts for IB (or in an adjustment of the 
constant (with respect to a c, being considered) term in an equation (10).
A more interesting complication arises given information 7s®. Here, 3 has made 
a pooling announcement, and SB is uncertain of f ’s type, attaching a subjective 
probability Aj to the probability that J is an optimist. Thus, in equations (10.2) and 
(10.5), SB substitutes in values for the / ’s corresponding to contracts A  accepted and 
contracts which either type of 3 will accept. Contracts like or Cj in either figure are 
entered probabilistically: if A  refused to accept 3's offered contract, and offered (pa, / a) 
represented by Cj or Cj, which SB did not intend to accept, SB would substitute the 
quantity A j/a for f as in (10.5) in order to decide whether to accept f”s offered contract. 
Similarly, if A  refused 3 and offered {pa, f a) represented by in Figure 2, SB would 
substitute the quantity (1 — A j)/a for f as in (10.5). The Stackelberg leader problem also 
complicates these comparisons: it could be that SB has to choose between accepting cs 
followed by 3 rejecting ca versus rejecting cs followed by 3 accepting ca with probability 
1 - A f
6.3. A ’s Contract Acceptances in Step 3
As in the cases of 3 and SB, in subgame-perfect equilibrium, no type of A  has any 






















































































































































































least probability A. It is common knowledge that, whether or not c,- is accepted by SB, 
will accept Cj and 'SL will reject. For Xb >  A > A„, A  can anticipate that SB will 
accept Cj and can also confidently anticipate that SB will on average regret this decision. 
(After all, A  believes that Aa is the correct prior, otherwise he would have updated it 
upon learning that SB believes prior Aj.) This is not possible if prior beliefs over the 
likelihood of a player being optimistic are consistent.
Having used Aj, to make the calculations about how likely IB believes it is that 'i 
will accept various contracts, and thus coming to anticipate SB’s behavior, A  now 
“corrects” these calculations by substituting in Aa in order to come up with his best 
estimate of the odds of f  accepting these contracts. He then substitutes these 
probabilistic values of f” s acceptances together with the deterministic values of SB’s 
acceptances into equations (10.1) and (10.3) to determine which of his contracts to sign 
in step 3, now engaging in precisely the same kind of Stackelberg leader problem 
discussed above.
Finally consider information (7̂ ®, 75®), i. e., pooling announcement by both IB 
and 7. A  calculates, using Aj, the predictions S  would make as to the likelihood of !f 
accepting any particular contract; these predictions are independent of S ’s type. Next, 
A  calculates, separately for SB̂  and SB̂ , which contracts that type of player IB will 
accept. Then A  attaches probability A„ to the acceptance of any contract SB̂  would 
accept and probability (1 — Aa) to the acceptance of any contract SB̂  would accept. Still 
using Aa as his prior, he now conditions his probabilities that 7 will accept contracts on 
SB’s probabilistic behavior only in that SB must either have been the offeror or must have 
rejected a c.ontract for it to be available to J.
The resulting version of the Stackelberg leader problem has an interesting 




























































































neither type of will accept contract Cj, while if A  rejects contract c;, (3Ŝ  but not %L 
will accept contract Cj. As before, A  makes this decision simply by comparing the 
expected utility in subgame-perfect equilibrium continuation of having C; accepted and 
Cj rejected for certain versus having ci rejected for certain and Cj accepted with 
probability Aa; this comparison is a straightforward variation on equations (10).
6-4- Summary of Futures Contract Acceptance Behavior
In the order of commitment randomly determined by nature, players decide 
which, if any, of the open contracts they wish to accept. In subgame-perfect 
equilibrium, they do this by anticipating, to the extent possible, how the contract 
acceptance behavior following their acceptance decisions will respond to their decisions. 
Anticipation can only be determinate if the player whose acceptance behavior is being 
predicted exhibited separating equilibrium announcements, so that rivals have learned 
his type from the contract he offered.
PROPOSITION 1: Under doubly inconsistent incomplete information, any set of
contract announcements yields a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium continuation.
Uniqueness depends upon the convention that a player indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting a contract accepts. The point, though, is that doubly 
inconsistent incomplete information does not create a game in which any behavior can 
be rationalized. Contract acceptance behavior is as uniquely determined by the 
rationality postulates supporting subgame-perfect equilibrium as in a game of consistent 





























































































PROPOSITION 2: In subgame-perfect equilibrium continuation following any set of
contract announcements, no player alters his contract acceptance behavior to avoid 
revealing his type.
Separating equilibrium behavior in steps 3-5 stems from two sources: 
independence of extraction behavior from beliefs, and independence of payoffs from 
rivals’ types, given the contracts that are accepted by rivals.
PROPOSITION 3: Contract acceptance behavior of any player i when any rivals deciding 
after i have revealed their types is essentially a matter of anticipating which contracts 
will be accepted following any behavior by i, and then simply deciding whether i would 
prefer the pattern of acceptances that includes his acceptance of an open contract to the 
pattern that includes his rejection of that contract.
PROPOSITION 4: Contract acceptance behavior of any player i when some rival
deciding after i has not revealed his type involves anticipating the subjectively expected 
pattern of acceptances following any behavior by i, and then simply deciding whether i 
would prefer the stochastic pattern of acceptances that includes his acceptance of an 
open contract to the pattern that includes his rejection of that contract. When the 
player committing first makes this determination, he anticipates the behavior of the 
player committing second by anticipating the behavior of the player committing third 
using the second player’s prior beliefs (with which he disagrees), and then using his own 
prior beliefs to predict both rivals’ behavior.
7. Step 2 Announcements in the Order
PROPOSITION 5: In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, the player committing first




























































































Since the announcements are simultaneous, A ’s rivals in the .AIM order cannot 
gain in step 2 from learning A ’s type. Proposition 2 has already shown that A will 
choose to separate, revealing his type, in step 3 before his rivals take their next actions. 
So in a pooling announcement, at least one type of player A would be sacrificing payoff.
Initially, the next subsection also assumes that players IB and f  make separating 
announcements. The following subsection discusses the existence of a separating 
equilibrium. Subsection 7.3 considers the scope for semi-pooling equilibria in which at 
least one of IB and 7 hides his type at step 2.
7.1. Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Announcements with Type Revelation
Some further notation will actually help to simplify matters. Let 71 denote the 
information in the event under discussion, the union across types in which all players 
make separating announcements in step 2. Let c_,- =  (Cj, c^) be the vector of contracts 
offered by player i's two rivals. Any player i, prior to step 2, can calculate how the rest 
of the game will be played following separating actions (c!-,c_t): the backwards-
inductive process of sections 4 and 6 can be applied. Let rJ(c!-,c_!) denote this 
calculable sequence of subgame-perfect equilibrium actions (in the separating 
equilibrium case, r- depends upon i only in the order of the arguments).
At the beginning of step 2, type t of player i is considering what contract— a 
futures price and a take-it-or-leave-it futures position—to announce as the market 
opens. When this decision is made, t knows his own type, but not that of the other 
players, since announcements are simultaneous. If equilibrium calls for player to 
choose (pure) action c j  and player j L to choose action c^, then player i views this as a 
A; probability that action c^  will be taken and a (1 — A;-) probability that action cj will 
be taken, as if player j  were using a mixed strategy. However, the remaining player k 




























































































probabilities i attaches do nof'depend on ï s type. For any player i and fixed actions for 
each type of each other player, let
X_i =  ( c f .c f ) ,  A,.(l -  (c;i ,c f ) ,A ,.( l -A I.); (c f,c£ ),( 1 - A ;)2],
which is the (mixed) action profile facing i. Based upon r;, let /5;(c;, x_,-) be the 
probabilistic sequence of subgame-perfect actions following c;, Substituting ri into
y .  for each c_ ; in the carrier of X-i, a function Gj can specify the expected payoff 
G\{cj,X-i I p,-,/*) that would result if t responded to X—i with C;. The functional form of 
G\ is messy and unenlightening, requiring further notation not otherwise needed.
Then let g\(x~i I Pji-f1) be the set of best responses:
'4 e 9\i(x_i I ^ /*)=><?{(£{,x - i  I P iJ ')  > G{(c,X-i I P iJ1) Vc.
Subgame-perfect equilibrium announcements then have the usual specification: a 
vector (c|) - -  x '$ 'S t  = H L  such that
c\ e  g\(X-i I Pi, I 1) for all i and t.
For the moment, existence of separating equilibrium is assumed; discussion of this issue 
is rejoined later in this section.
Our concern is with the logic of what announcements to make. We initially 
consider player A, and consider the possibility that A  will sell futures to S’, with x~a 
and the functional form of pa given. The reader’s attention is returned briefly to 




























































































exogenous parameters (in particular, by the accepting player’s risk tolerance, see (10)). 
When the gains from trade are sufficiently large (due to unhedged stocks and trades 
with the unshown player) relative to the difference in beliefs between an optimist and a 
pessimist, Figure 1 results; when they are relatively insufficient, the situation is as 
depicted in Figure 2. We will explore in some detail A ’s choice of a futures contract to 
announce for the situation depicted in Figure 1.
Recall that the vertical intercepts for lines in Figure 1, indicating contracts that 
are minimally acceptable to (higher upward-sloping line), (lower upward-sloping 
line), 3^ (higher downward-jloping line) and 3^ (lower downward-sloping line), all 
depend upon the futures positions the two players are exchanging with IB, which are not 
otherwise shown in Figure 1. However, at step 2 in a separating equilibrium, IB’s type 
is not known, and thus these lines are viewed by A  as each taking on one location with 
probability corresponding to off (or simply to fB^), and another location with 
probability 1 — Aa, corresponding to cfc (to fB )̂, as illustrated in Figure 3.
In Figure 3, the two solid upward-sloping lines, CT and DF, correspond to the 
two positions of loci of contracts minimally acceptable to JiL, for and fB£; so also 
the two solid downward-sloping lines, AB and LZ, bound f ’s acceptable contracts, for 
1Bff and fB£. Similarly, the dashed upward-sloping lines, JQ and HP, are minimally 
acceptable contracts for J. " , given and fB̂ ; the dashed downward-sloping lines, KT 
and GF (atop hatched trapezoids), bound contracts acceptable to 3s , given and 
fB .̂ As a set, a pair of dashed lines must lie above the corresponding set of solid lines 
in Figure 3, but the relation between the higher dashed line and the lower solid line 
varies across parameter constellations. Figure 3 draws .A’s minimally acceptable 
contracts as more strongly influenced by the direct affect of .A’s type than by the 






















































































































































































For contrast, !f’s just acceptable contracts are drawn as more heavily influenced by the 
type dependence of fB’s announcements than by IPs type. A priori, either arrangement 
is possible for either player.
The directional impact of IB’s type is not clear a priori, either. For example, line 
CT, for A^, and line JQ, for A ^ , have to refer to the same type of player fB; which 
type depends on parameters, in murky ways. To aid in following the discussion, we will 
maintain for this section the mnemonic assumption that each line for 1B  ̂ is higher than 
the corresponding line for IB2". Thus, for A^, A ^ , lines CT, JQ, AB, and KT
correspond to type 1B̂  (so A  considers them relevant with probability 1 — Aa) , while 
lines DF, HP, LZ, and GF correspond to type 1B̂  (so A  considers them relevant with 
probability Aa).
The situation in step 2 has A  deciding what contract offer to announce, knowing 
that he gets the chance to commit himself to rejecting any contracts he wishes to reject 
in step 3, before the other players have a similar commitment opportunity. Thus, for 
the moment, we are considering what contract to announce, assuming A  can make if a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer. Naturally, A  will announce an offer that is acceptable to 
himself; Figure 3 indicates regions in which offers will be acceptable to J under different 
states (types of fB and J). Contracts in the triangle ABC will be accepted by J no 
matter what J’s or fB’s type, i. e., accepted with probability one. Contracts in the 
horizontally hatched trapezoid KABT will be accepted by J if either J or IB is an 
optimist, i. e., accepted with probability 1 — (1 -  A„)2 =  Aa(2 — Aa), using X ’s subjective 
probabilities. Contracts in the unshaded trapezoid LKXZ will be accepted by both 
types of If given fB , and rejected by both types given IB̂ , so the probability of 




























































































GLZF will be accepted only if 3 and IB are both optimists, an event .A views as having 
probability Â .
7.1.1. Offers with the Same Probability of Acceptance
PROPOSITION 6: If the second (j)  and third (A:) players in the commitment order make 
separating announcements (as does the first player i), then i:
[a] examines each combination of rivals’ types for which an offer is accepted by k with 
some given probability and determines the conditionally efficient contract for each 
combination;
[b] determines, among these efficient contracts with k, the one that has the highest 
expected profit;
[c] repeats steps [a] and [bj to determine an efficient offer to j\
[d] finally selects the offer (directed to j  or k) that provides the highest expected profit.
We initially consider the question of what take-it-or-leave-it offer A  should make 
to 3 if A  is artificially restricted to a collection of offers which will all be accepted with 
the same probability, and then remove this restriction. For concreteness, Figure 4 
presents the case of offers which will be accepted with probability one. In Figure 4, AB 
(carried over from Figure 3) is the upper boundary on contracts that will be acceptable 
even to 3^, even if IB is type thus, with probability one. A  knows his own type, so 
only the two upward-sloping lines relevant to that type have been carried over to Figure 
4: CB bounds contracts acceptable to A  given B̂£, while DF bounds contracts
acceptable to A  given fB^. Of course, for any given futures position A  might announce 
(on the horizontal axis), he prefers to announce as high a price as will be acceptable, so 
the contracts under consideration lie along the line segment. AB.
If were the type profile, these contracts would all provide A  with the
























































































































































































Efficiency differentials can simply be determined by the difference between the price 
%
that would be set by f ’s marginal willingness to pay and the price that would be set by 
JL’s marginal willingness to accept, if each were to view the price as immutable. Figure 
4 shows the demand curve of type given for futures positions bought from A  
(treating price as immutable, still): the dashed line AH which bisects the angle CAB; it 
also shows the supply curve of A  for futures sales to J, given the dashed line CG 
which bisects the angle ACB. These demand and supply curves intersect at M, so the 
contract that would extract the most surplus for .A, given '3̂ , is the price/quantity pair 
at J.
Next suppose 5 ^ , but still with contracts restricted to AB. Given this 
restriction, it is still appropriate to treat AH as the demand curve to measure surplus 
extraction, but now the relevant supply curve is DJ, which bisects ADF. It intersects 
AH at L, so K is the contract which will yield the highest addition to payoff given SB̂ .
Suppose A  were to announce K and SB’s type were revealed to be fB̂ . In this 
event, how much lower will .A’s payoff be than if he had announced J? Simply by the 
amount of the inefficiency associated with K, because both contracts were fully surplus- 
extracting. That conditional inefficiency is the area of the vertically hatched triangle 
LMN. Similarly, if J were announced and then 3!^ revealed, .A’s payoff would be lower 
than having announced K by the area of the horizontally hatched triangle JLM. Since 
these two triangles are congruent, in the binary choice between J and K, A  prefers K if 
and only if A0 >  1/2.
Consider A  announcing a contract c along AB incrementally to the right of K. 
With probability Aa, c reduces .A’s payoff relative to K by the height of the horizontally 
hatched triangle just below c, while with probability 1 — Aa, c increases .A’s payoff by 




























































































then, trades off these gains and losses to equate their marginal expectation, and is 
c* =  AaK +  (1 — Aa)J. Figure 4 illustrates for the case Aa =  0.6: below R, the height of 
the line LM above. S is 0.6 times the height ST, so R (a price P and futures position Q) 
is A ’s preferred choice among contracts that will be,accepted with probability one.
The preferred contract among those along line KT in Figure 3, contracts that 
will be accepted if either type or type 3 ^  materializes, is determined similarly, with 
the added complication that these contracts are accepted with probability one given 
3 ^ , but only with probability A„ (that if is S^) given 3^. Thus, if AB in Figure 4 
represented KT from Figure 3, the area of triangle JLM would have to be multiplied by 
Aa before comparison with LMN, and the corresponding c* would be 
A„(2 — Aa)K + (1 — Aa)"J. Contracts along LZ and those along GF in Figure 3 would be 
rejected unless 3  is 3 ^ , so the analysis corresponding to Figure 4 would simply yield 
contracts corresponding to K as maximizing the only relevant efficiency calculation.
7.1.2. Offers with Different Probabilities of Acceptance
Suppose the preferred contract for A  among each group of equally likely 
acceptances has been found, and consider the binary comparison among them. Line AB 
in Figure 5 (carried over from Figures 3 and 4) represents the set of contracts that will 
be accepted with probability one. Repeating Figure 4’s analysis, the demand curve AH 
is intersected with supply curves CG and DJ, yielding conditionally efficient positions 
shown by dotted vertical lines (but unlabeled). The efficient convex combination for 
Aa =  0.6 has again been labeled R. To keep the diagram relatively simple, the contract 
that will be compared with R is the preferred contract among those that will be 
accepted with probability Aa. In keeping with the conventions assumed in drawing 
Figure 3, these contracts, along LZ carried over from Figure 3, are accepted by either 























































































































































































SB̂ , hence supply curve DJ, in deciding which of these contracts is efficient. It 
intersects the relevant demand curve LQ at S, so N is the most preferred of these 
contracts.
The point of Figure 5 is the calculation of which of these two contracts yields the 
higher expected payoff given subgame-perfect equilibrium continuation p_a (which has 
been reflected in the vertical intercepts). By way of convenient reference, we will let 0 
represent the expected payoff associated with .A’s announcement being rejected (recall 
that c_a is being held fixed, and behavior for the rest of the game becomes common 
knowledge at the end of step 2). With probability 1 — Aa, SB will be S B ^ , and R would be 
accepted by J while N would be rejected. The profitability of R given SB̂  is the area* 
under the relevant demand curve AH and above the relevant supply curve CG from the 
axis over to U; this is the area of the vertically hatched trapezoid AKYC. With 
probability A0, SB will be and both contracts will be accepted, so it remains to 
calculate the excess profitability to J. of N over R given This can be shown as the 
sum of two areas, by comparison with the contract U, which would sell the same futures 
position to J as R, but at a price high enough to extract all surplus from type 3^. The 
excess payoff from U over R is a pure revenue affect, the area of the obliquely hatched 
rectangle RUTP. Relative to U, N gains by extracting the fully efficient level of 
surplus; this is the area of the cross-hatched triangle VSW. So N is preferred to R if A„ 
times the sum of areas RUTP and VSW exceeds (1 — Aa) times area AKYC. (For the 
parameters underlying Figure 5, A0 =  0.6 is not quite large enough to yield N preferred 
to R.)7
An exactly analogous logic can be applied to contract offers that J. might offer to 
IB, and then the contract which is the best _4. could offer SB is compared in additional 




























































































be made for the expected profitability of contracts which would have an interior 
probability of acceptance by US and a positive probability of acceptance by J conditional 
upon rejection by IB; this would be similar though messier, and would arise in 
equilibrium only for unusual parameter constellations. While in principal a contract 
announced at step 2 is being offered to the market,
PROPOSITION 7: Proposition 6 implies that targeting any announcement to the player 
with whom the greatest gains from trade are at stake is typically best response 
behavior.
None of the logic explained via Figures 4 and 5 depended upon .A’s type, except 
to include the relevant upward-sloping lines from Figure 3. Also, with probabilistic 
continuation p_ ; specified, none of the logic depended upon the identities or roles of the 
players. For example, diagrams corresponding to Figures 3-5 but contemplating the 
announcement $ might make of a contract to buy futures, targeted for IB, will have If 
pricing a position so that any lower price has a lower acceptance probability, and will 
presumably show a more dramatic shift in response to _A’s type, since commits first, 
but will otherwise follow the lines discussed. Thus, our layout of the logic of separating 
equilibrium is complete. 7
7For the comparison between the best contract accepted for sure and the best contract accepted 
if either rival is an optimist, an analysis similar to Figure 5 would also have to take into account an 
•efficiency advantage o f N over R in the event that would correspond to the vertically hatched
trapezoid VSXY. Suppose the alternative being compared to R were the best contract among those 
that would only be accepted if both rivals were optimists; let this be represented by N in Figure 5. 
Then for N to be preferred to R requires that Â  times the sum o f areas RUTP and VSW  exceed 
(1 —A„) times area AKYC. The underlying logic that would be applied in the event that 
configurations in Figure 3 were changed, or that Figure 2 rathe! than Figure 1 might result for some 




























































































7.2. Remarks on Existence of a Separating Equilibrium
To our knowledge, the literature on existence of a separating equilibrium has not 
offered a proof covering the case of an extensive form with three players simultaneously 
choosing from an unordered continuum of signals prior to a sequential-move subgame; 
this paper will not change that situation. By and large, adding realism to the 
deliberately demonstrative model considered here would surely not ease these 
complications. Furthermore, an added complication of this model is that best-response 
correspondences, while they are upper-hemicontinuous, fail to be convex-valued: there 
is a value for A0 which makes J. indifferent between N and R in Figure 5, but in this 
case, J. strictly prefers either N or R to any convex combination which would only be 
accepted if fB’s type were ‘35W (i. e., in the unshaded trapezoid in Figure 3). Convex­
valued best responses could perhaps be attained by a continuum of types (as in the 
simpler situation considered by Mailath [1988]), but this seems likely to introduce new 
difficulties in the treatment of inconsistent incomplete information. It is also possible 
that the nonconvexities constitute the sort of “controlled discontinuities” for which 
Dasgupta and Maskin [1986] offer existence theorems, but only in finite strategic form 
games.
Competing our tour of standard assumptions of existence proofs, we remark that 
compactness is not a problem in this model. Since the functions all involve 
quadratic terms in futures positions with negative coefficients, there must exist a finite 
number which is a nonbinding absolute bound on the f i coefficient of any best response. 
With the f f  s artificially but harmlessly bounded, it is then similarly possible to obtain 
a nonbinding, finite upper bound on the Pj component of best responses. Without loss 




























































































The fact we found a one-parameter family of subgame-perfect equilibria in our 
similar model where inconsistent beliefs were common knowledge (Phlips and Harstad 
[1991]) is also encouraging for the existence of a separating equilibrium here.
7.3. Remarks on Existence, Nature and Plausibility of a Semi-Pooling Equilibrium
Proposition 5 has shown the nonexistence of completely pooling equilibrium, as 
the player who commits first does not pool. Thus, the issue discussed here is the 
possibility of a semi-pooling equilibrium, in which both types would make the same 
contract offer announcement, and then separate in their contract acceptance behavior, 
for one or both of the players committing last. In this section, for this model, that is 
what the term “pooling equilibrium” will mean.
The canonical signaling games (see van Damme [1987], ch. 10, for an 
introduction) achieve pooling equilibria by having the receiving player’s payoff depend 
directly on the signaling player’s type, and by having the receiver respond to an out-of­
equilibrium message based upon an assumption about sender’s type that is unfortunate 
for one type of sender. As a result, that type of sender’s predominant interest is in 
imitating the equilibrium message of the other type of sender.
It does not require the sort of subtle thinking debated in the refinements 
literature (van Damme [1987] and references cited) to restrict acceptance behavior 
following out-of-equilibrium contract offer announcements. A player’s payoff depends 
upon a rivals’ type only through the contracts that are accepted; no player changes his 
own contract acceptance behavior directly as a result of his belief about a rival’s type. 
The only possible impact is that during step 3 or 4, a player may alter his contract 
acceptance behavior in response to a belief that a rival’s type will lead to particular 
acceptance behavior in following steps; in what follows, we call this the “pooling 




























































































type is uncertain, or is believed to be revealed by an out-of-equilibrium move is clearly 
disequilibrium behavior in this model.
Thus, there is no particular incentive for types of a player to pool in order to 
avoid revealing their types, other than the pooling impact. Its possible benefit is 
limited by the binary nature of the sequential decisions. It seems most likely, in a 
pooling equilibrium scenario, that a pooling impact beneficial to one type of a player is 
harmful to that player’s other type. It follows that type t' will not benefit from an 
effort of type t to imitate type t1, so t' will only alter his contract announcement from a 
separating equilibrium choice if and only if doing so separates. Hence, t’s benefit from 
the pooling impact would have to increase his equilibrium payoff more them the 
decrease that resulted from announcing the contract that was a best response for t' 
rather than for t. We have no proof that such pooling equilibria exist only for unlikely 
parameter constellations, but this seems the most natural conclusion to conjecture.
Should both a separating and a pooling equilibrium exist, refinements that are 
only well-defined for finite games or single-signaler, single-receiver games will not 
directly offer useful distinctions. However, we can envision an argument of the 
following sort. Any pooling equilibrium supported by beliefs that an out-of-equilibrium 
message was sent by the type benefiting from the pooling impact, when that message 
could be a sensible announcement for the type who does not benefit from the pooling 
arrangement is likely to seem less plausible than the separating equilibrium, under the 
same sort of arguments raised in refining pooling equilibria of finite signaling games.
8. Market Efficiency
We briefly discuss the efficiency of trading in this model, assuming that behavior 




























































































singly-inconsistent case: whether each player is optimistic is his own private
information, but the subjective prior odds are consistent: Xa =  Aj =  As. Each player is 
offering a take-it-or-leave-it contract which maximizes his share of gains from exchange, 
given the behavior of the others and equilibrium continuation. Thus, each has 
incentives to take efficiency into account. In particular, a social planner faced with the 
same informational constraints as the players could not suggest ex ante an alternative 
pattern of behavior that would yield a higher expected payoff for one type of one player 
without yielding a lower expected payoff for some type of some player (possibly the 
other type of the same player). In this sense, the singly-inconsistent case reaches an 
outcome that is informationally constrained, ex ante efficient.
It is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory definition of an efficient outcome for the 
doubly inconsistent case, the general case analyzed above. Players disagree about the 
strength of demand for an exhaustible resource at the maturity date of a futures 
market; neither optimists or pessimists revise their beliefs even if certain that others 
hold different beliefs. This is essential for rational players to strictly prefer some 
speculative trades to foregoing any speculative trade which is acceptable to the trading 
partner. In addition, here, we have allowed players to have inconsistent prior beliefs 
about the probability that another player is an optimist; A  does not revise his estimate 
of the odds that f  is an optimist upon learning that “35 attaches higher odds.
One could argue that the efficiency of the contract offers made be evaluated in 
terms of the “true” odds A, treating any Aa, Aj, As as mistaken unless it happens to 
agree with the true A. It would then be possible to create an alternative for a social 
planner to suggest, that would generate an alternative outcome such that, if players 





























































































We regard such an efficiency analysis as nonsense. If players are mistaken in 
their beliefs about a true parameter of the model, then the relevance of such rationality- 
based machinery as subgame perfection is unclear. Our basic philosophical position, 
moreover, is that no such “true” A exists: the players have fundamental differences in 
opinion, the A(-’s are primitives, and there is no sense in which any A,- can be considered 
“incorrect” while anything else can be considered “correct.”
Let the rationality of each player i evaluating uncertainty over types via A;- be 
accepted for the purposes of a welfare analysis that is at least a distant analogue to 
efficiency. Then the following sort of characterization holds for the separating 
equilibrium. There is no alternative pattern of offer and acceptance behavior which a 
social planner, subject to the same informational constraints and to subgame-perfect 
equilibrium actions guided by the individual Aj’s, could suggest that would yield an 
outcome in which some type of some player viewed himself as attaining a higher 
expected payoff, without the other type of the same player or some type of another 
player viewing himself as attaining a lower expected payoff.
In sum, despite doubly inconsistent incomplete information, a logic of specific 
rational behavior that was straightforward, step-by-step, emerges. It predicts a nonzero 
volume of purely speculative activity, roughly akin to ex ante efficiency. Inconsistent 
priors increase the difficulties of calculating equilibrium strategies by at least an order 
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